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Comments
CONTRACTS-PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
FOR INDEFINITE DURATION
INTRODUCTION

Morsinkhkoff v. De Luxe Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co.,. a recent Missouri case,

involved the problem of employment contracts for an indefinite duration. The
plaintiff, a plant supervisor and engineer earning $7,500 a year, obtained an interview with the individual defendants, Samuel Paul and his father, officers of defendant corporation, at defendant's plant on April 29, 1955. The interview, plaintiff
claimed, resulted in an oral contract whereby he was to work for defendant beginning June 6. The alleged salary was to be $200 a week, which defendant said would
amount to $10,000 a year. On May 1, plaintiff gave notice of termination to his
present employer. On May 3, a conversation with defendant indicated no change in
the arrangements, but on May 11, plaintiff was notified by the employment agency
through which he had secured the interview that the employment was no longer
open, and was thereby obliged to accept another position at $6,500 a year.
Plaintiff brought suit on the oral contract; the lower court entered a $1280 judgment
for the plaintiff. 2 On appeal, the judgment was reversed by the Kansas City'Court
of Appeals, which held that the contract was for an indefinite period, terminable at
will by either party without liability. The court also said that if the contract was
for one year it was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds as a contract not
to be performed within a year of its making.3
1. 344 S.W.2d 639 (K.C. Ct. App. 1961).
2. The judgment was for the employment bonus lost by plaintiff because
he resigned his job in the middle of the year and for one month's salary while he
was out of work.
3. Where the parties have reached an oral agreement of employment omitting
the term of the employment, some courts will construe the contract to run for the
period of compensation. See infra note 10 and accompanying text. This construction
may place the contract among those not to be performed within one year, enforcement of which would seemingly be barred by the Statute of Frauds. However, there is authority for the position that the contract may be withdrawn from
the operation of the statute. One authority asserts that there are many cases where
a plaintiff may have so far changed his position that there would be a moral fraud
committed unless the contract is enforced, and that there should be no difference
between moral fraud and the legal fraud for which equity courts have always given
relief. Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the Statute of Frauds, 79

U. PA. L. Ray. 440 (1931).
The courts often say they will not allow the statute to be used to perpetrate
a fraud. E.g., Finlay v. Swirsky, 103 Conn. 624, 131 Ati. 420 (1925). In order to
prevent fraud some courts have applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to
this type of case. See, e.g., Brewood v. Cook, 207 F.2d 439 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Fibre(611)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1962], Art. 8

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

The agreement was an oral bilateral contract whereby plaintiff promised to
work for defendant in exchange for defendant's promise to pay for the services
rendered. Clearly all the necessary elements of a binding agreement were present,
but the major question for the court concerned the length of the agreement.
Obviously the parties meant the employment to have some substantial duration,
but neither necessarily meant it to be permanent in the usual sense of the word,
and the court was faced with the problem of interpreting a contract which was
silent as to duration of obligation.
The basic problem involved is not new to Anglo-American law; indeed, it has
probably existed in one form or another for as long as men have sought to create
the master-servant, employer-employee relationship. Within the last one hundred
years, however, the development of new legal theories has forced several shifts in
the judicial approach to the problem. To adequately justify or criticize the result
reached in Morsinkhoff, an examination of these approaches seems necessary. With
that end in view, this article will attempt to set forth the various solutions which
might be applied, and to reach thereby a conclusion as to the soundness of the
decision in Morsinkkoff.
I. VIEWS ON EMPLOYMENT CoNTRACTs

Courts have taken three different approaches in interpreting contracts for
"permanent employment" or employment of an indefinite duration.' These three
board Prods., Inc. v. Townsend, 202 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1953); Wolfe v. Wallingford
Bank & Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 1 A.2d 146 (1938); Meads v. Stott, 193 Ore.
509, 238 P.2d 236 (1951). See generally 3 WILLISTON, CONncRTs § 533A (3d ed.
1960); 49 AM. JUR. Statute of Frauds § 581 (1943); Summers, supra. The Missouri
Supreme Court has said that the doctrine of estoppel is as old as the Statute of
Frauds and as such is a part of the common law of the State. Therefore it is not
inconsistent with either that one may work a modification of the other. Taylor v.
Zepp, 14 Mo. 482 (1851).
The doctrine of promissory estoppel is discussed in another context in a later
part of this article. Infra Section III. However, it would appear that the facts in
Morsinkkhof might justify application of the doctrine to remove the contract from
the operation of the Statute of Frauds. Apparently overlooking this possibility,
the court in Morsinkkoif, by way of dictum, asserted that the contract was unenforceable under the statute. But in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d
295 (9th Cir. 1954), it was held that promissory estoppel was applicable where
plaintiff had given up another job under which he had seniority rights and moved
to Alaska on the basis of an oral contract for two years. See also Seymour v.
Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 Pac. 88 (1909). It should be noted, though, that the
doctrine has also been rejected as a means of taking a contract out of the statute
under facts similar to the main case. Kahn v. Cecella Co., 40 F. Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y.
1941). Another court has stated that it would be possible to apply the doctrine in
this area, but found that moving from California and leasing a house was not a
sufficient detriment to satisfy the statute. Kooba v. Jacobitti, 59 N.J. Super. 496,
158 A.2d 194 (App. Div. 1960).
For the most complete step-by-step development of the doctrine in a single
state see Sessions v. So. California Edison Co., 45 Cal. App.2d 611, 118 P.2d 935
(Dist. Ct. App. 1941); Wilk v. Vincill, 30 Cal.2d 104, 180 P.2d 351 (1947); Le
Blond v. Wolfe, 83 Cal. App.2d 282, 188 P.2d 278 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
4. This problem arises in one of two ways: (a) Either the hiring clause of a
written contract is indefinite as to the duration of the employment or simply states
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss4/8
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views will, for ease of reference, be called the English view, the Williston view and
the American view.5
A. The English Rule
The English view, that of the original common law, was that any employment
contract which was indefinite as to duration would be considered a hiring for one
year.6 This was the rule in all English and American common law jurisdictions
until the middle of the Nineteenth Century,7 when the newer American view became prevalent in this country; it is still followed in a few American jurisdictions.8
However, the original doctrine has been modified in some states9 so that the employment is held to correspond to the period of the compensation. 0 Thus, in
Adams v. Stewart," where the contract provided for a yearly salary paid monthly,
2
the court found a contract for a year.'
B. The Wilhiston Approach
The second view of contracts for "permanent employment" is the Williston
view.'3 Professor Williston has argued that "permanent employment" means employment which is to last as long as the employee is able to perform his work
properly and as long as the employer remains in the same business. This position
the employment is to be permanent; or (b) the contract is oral, as is the contract
in the main case, and oral testimony is required for proof of duration.
5. As these views are all well established, they will only be outlined briefly,
and reference will be made to cases and texts where the subject is treated more
fully. It should also be noted that the courts do not distinguish between the contracts claiming permanent employment and those which are simply indefinite as to
their duration. Annot., 35 A.L.R. 1432 (1925); 15 N.C.L. REv. 276 (1937). See
generally Annots., 135 A.L.R. 646 (1941), 35 A.L.R. 1432 (1925).
6. Annots., 161 A.L.R. 708 (1946), 100 A.L.R. 835 (1936), 11 A.L.R. 470
(1921); 1 LABATr, MASTER AND SERVANT § 156 (2d ed. 1913).
7. Labatt indicates that Blackstone based this rule upon an equitable principle which provided that a master should have the services of the servant, and the
servant the opportunity to work, for a full revolution of the seasons. 1 LABArr,
op. cit. supra note 6. Labatt himself, however, attributed the rule to the practice of
generalizing certain early statutes to conform with the common usage of the times.
Ibid.
8. Annots., 161 A.L.R. 699 (1946), 100 A.L.R. 835 (1936), 11 A.L.R. 471
(1921).
9. Annots., 100 A.L.R. 835 (1936), 11 A.L.R. 471 (1921).
10. England and the Commonwealth countries now hold these contracts
terminable upon reasonable notice, but give great weight to the period of compensation in determining reasonableness. 1 WILLISTON, CoNTR1crrs § 39 (3rd ed. 1957);
Annot., 161 A.L.R. 707 (1946). For the early development of the doctrine in the
Commonwealth, see 1 LABATr, Op. cit. supra note 6, § 158.
11. 228 Ala. 194, 153 So. 401 (1934).
12. Accord, Moline Lumber Co. v. Harrison, 128 Ark. 260, 194 S.W. 25 (1917);
Southwell v. Parker Plow Co., 234 Mich. 292, 207 N.W. 873 (1926); Masonite
Corp. v. Handshoe, 208 Miss. 166, 44 So. 2d 41 (1950); Dennis v. Thermoid Co.,
128 N.J.L. 303, 25 A.2d 886 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942); Godson v. MacFadden, 162
Tenn. 528, 39 S.W.2d 287 (1931); City of San Antonio v. Condie, 329 S.W.2d 947
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (hiring for a month).
13. 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 39.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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has not gained wide acceptance in the United States, and, where adopted, usually
involves special technical services or the reduction of competition, whereby the
promisor agrees to employ the promisee if the promisee will close his competing
business or leave previous employment with a competitor.' The facts of the main
case do not lend themselves to this interpretation.
C. The American Ride
The so-called American view of employment contracts of indefinite duration
is that they are terminable at the will of either party, without cause and without
liability on the part of the terminator, unless a specific intent of the parties to the
contrary is shown.15 This rule is followed in thirty-two states,16 Missouri included.2Although its origins are obscure,1s the rule seems to have begun its development
during the Nineteenth Century. However, irrespective of its origins, the rule does
exist today, and in most cases is held to be a rule of law and not merely a rebuttable presumption. Since the higher the position, the more probable it becomes that
the parties contemplated a considerable period,' 6 this often results in situations
where the parties' intent is disregarded, and a result reached which the parties never
0
contemplated.2
While a few courts still seek to discover intention and apply it, most have
adopted the rule that presence or absence of a second consideration is conclusive
of this intent. Therefore, a contract, in order not to be terminable at will, must
have two considerations, one for the contract and one to give the character of

14. E.g., Roxana Petroleum Co. v. Rice, 109 Okla. 161, 235 Pac. 502 (1924);
Irkley v. F. H. Roberts Co., 268 Mass. 246, 167 N.E. 289 (1929); Carnig v. Carr,
167 Mass. 544, 46 N.E. 117 (1897). See generally, Annot., 135 A.L.R. 646 (1941).
15. 1 LABATr, op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 159-160; 1 MECHEM, AGENCY § 592 (2d
ed. 1914); 26 Cyc. Master and Servant 972-76 (1907); 18 R.C.L. Master and
Servant §§ 19-20 (1917); Annots., 161 A.L.R. 709 (1946), 100 A.L.R. 835 (1936),
11 A.L.R. 470 (1921).
16. 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 31 (1948).
17. Culver v. Kurn, 354 Mo. 1158, 193 S.W.2d 602 (1946).
18. Labatt attributes the rule to the social and economic conditions in the
United States, which made the English rule seem out of place. 1 LABATr, op. cit.
supra note 6, § 160, at 519. Another author has expressed a different view, stating:
The source of the rule, that indefinite employment contracts are terminable
at will, can be traced to a statement made by an early American text
writer [WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 136 (2d ed. 1886)]. Citing no authority for his view, he says that such a contract is prima fade terminable
at will. This prima facie terminability by reason of the difficulty of establishing sufficient evidence to overcome it has the force of a rule of law.
15 N.C.L. REV. 276, 277 (1937).
19. The main case gives an excellent example of this statement. The intent of
the parties was in no way considered. If it had been, the fact that the position
was of a supervisory nature and that the plaintiff gave up a valuable job with a
bonus would seem to show that both parties had the intent that the job was to be
for a substantial period, and certainly not terminable before actual performance
started.
20. 1 LABATT, op. cit. supra note 6, § 160. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
AGENCY § 442, comment b (1957).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss4/8
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permanency.21 Independent or additional consideration serves to turn into constant, steady or even lifetime employments, contracts of hire which otherwise
would be terminable at will by either party. 22
This test of additional consideration originally was devised as an indication
of intention.23 However, it has now replaced the search for intent in most states
and in fact is often applied to defeat it, inasmuch as the additional consideration
is held to be conclusive of intent. 24 Two states, at least, have not been led astray,
and still look for the intent of the parties, regarding any additional consideration
as ouny a manitestation thereof; 22 but Missouri is among those which require the
additional consideration. 26
Since Missouri and most other states do require additional consideration, it
seems advisable to turn at this point to a more detailed examination of that
element.

II.

ADDITIONAL CONsrDERATION UNDER THE AMERICAN VIEW

Courts have held many types of consideration sufficient to constitute "additional consideration," including the revealing of a secret process, 2 r mutual convenience,28 and the release of a tort claim against the employer.29 In all these cases,
21. Eckhart v. Plastic Film Corp., 129 F. Supp. 277 (D. Conn. 1955); Alabama Mills v. Smith, 237 Ala. 296, 186 So. 699 (1939); Ruinello v. Murray, 36
Cal. 2d 722, 227 P.2d 251 (1951); Stone v. Burke, 110 Cal. App.2d 820, 244 P.2d
51 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Fisher v. Jackson, 142 Conn. 734, 118 A.2d 316 (1955);
Edwards v. Kentucky Util. Co., 286 Ky. 341, 150 S.W.2d 916 (1941); Lynas v.
Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 273 N.W. 315 (1937); Skagerberg v. Blandin
Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936); Producer's Gin Ass'n (AAL) v.
Beck, 215 Miss. 263, 60 So. 2d 642 (1952); Malever v. Kay Jewelry, 223 N.C. 148,
25 S.E.2d 436 (1943); Orsini v. Trojan Steel Corp., 219 S.C. 272, 64 S.E.2d 878
(1951); Savage v. Spur Distrib. Co., Inc., 33 Tenn. App. 27, 228 S.W.2d 122
(1949); 56 CJ.S. Master and Servant § 31 (1948); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),
AGENCY § 442, comments a and b; Annot., 135 A.L.R. 659 (1941).
22. Shealy v. Fowler, 182 S.C. 81, 188 S.E. 499 (1936).
23. Savarese v. Pyrene Mfg. Co., 9 N.J. 595, 89 A.2d 237 (1952); Eilen v.
Tappin's Inc., 16 N.J. Super. 53, 83 A.2d 817 (Super. Ct. L. 1951); 25 TEMP. L. Q.
495 (1952).
24. 25 TEMP. L. Q. 495 (1952).
25. Abbott v. Arkansas Util. Co., 165 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1948) (The court
held that in Arkansas all that is necessary is mutual promises.); McManigal v.
Hiatt, 240 Iowa 541, 36 N.W.2d 651 (1949). But cf. Lewis v. Minnesota Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 240 Iowa 1249, 37 N.W.2d 316 (1949) (four judges dissenting), apparently
requiring double consideration. However, two other recent Iowa cases, Miller v.
Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267 (1954), and Thompson v. Miller, 251 Iowa
324, 100 N.W.2d 410 (1960), indicate a swing back toward requiring only the
intent of the parties. For a discussion of the present state of the law in Iowa, see
47 IowA L. REv. 725 (1962).
26. Schonwald v. F. Burkart Mfg. Co., 356 Mo. 435, 202 S.W.2d 7 (1947);
Fullington v. Ozark Poultry Supply Co., 327 Mo. 1167, 39 S.W.2d 780 (1931).
27. Schonwald v. F. Burkart Mfg. Co., supra note 26; Beck v. Walkers, 24 Pa.
County Ct. 403 (1897).
28. Producer's Gin Ass'n v. Beck, supra note 21.
29. Eggers v. Armour & Co., 129 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1942); Brighton v. Lake
Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 112 Mich. 217, 70 N.W. 432 (1897); Texas Cent. Ry. Co.
v. Eldredge, 155 S.W. 1010 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
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the employee has suffered a detriment and the employer has gained some benefit.
A few courts have held that detriment to the promisee alone is sufficient consideration,8O following Williston's view of consideration.31 Partly because of the split by
the courts over the matter of whether a simple detriment without benefit to the
promisor is sufficient consideration for a contract itself, the courts have split in
deciding cases with facts similar to Morsinkkoff where the employee has given up
previous employment. 3z
In support of the contention that the giving up of employment is sufficient
consideration to prevent an employment contract from being terminable at will is
the Restatement of Agency.3 3 The period of the contract is held to be that of the
compensation period if the employee gives additional consideration, the employment is of such a nature that a temporary job is not likely,34 or the employer has
notice that the employee has made an important change of position."a
Following the lead of the Restatement, several courts have held the surrender
of employment to be sufficient additional consideration. In Fletcher v. Agar Mfg.
Corp.,"° decided by a Missouri federal district court, the plaintiff was working for
a competing company, and the defendant bargained with him to surrender this
employment and to accept employment with the defendant. The court, holding
the contract enforceable as one for permanent employment, found that this surrendering of employment was part of the consideration bargained for and was
sufficient to satisfy the additional consideration doctrine.
The Alabama Supreme Court has ruled that if the employer knows that the
person being employed is then employed, and that he is giving up previous em30. State ex rel. Kansas City v. State Highway Comm'n, 349 Mo. 865, 163
S.W.2d 948 (1942) (en banc); Duvall v. Duncan, 341 Mo. 1129, 111 S.W.2d 89
(1937); United States v. Westmoreland Manganese Corp., 134 F. Supp. 898 (E.D.
Ark. 1955); Bullock v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 371 (E.D. Pa. 1950);
Southern California Enterprises, Inc. v. D. N. & E. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d
750, 178 P.2d 785 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Mankin v. Bryant, 206 Ga. 120, 56
S.E.2d 447 (1949); Phelps v. Blome, 150 Neb. 547, 35 N.W.2d 93 (1948); Howard
Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Newman, 115 Vt. 61, 50 A.2d 896 (1947).
31. Williston says that the early basis for contracts was justified reliance upon
a promise, and that it is consistent with this development to define sufficient consideration as either a benefit to the promisor, a detriment to the promisee suffered
in reasonable reliance on the promise, or a combination of both. 1 WILLISTON, op.
cit. supra note 10, § 140, at 618.
32. In many of these cases there is the additional element of uprooting and
moving from one place to another. See, e.g., Fibreboard Products, Inc. v. Townsend,
supra note 16; Testard v. Penn-Jersey Auto Stores, 154 F. Supp.. 160 (E.D. Pa.
1956). This factor does not seem to affect the decisions materially, as there are
cases with this element present holding both ways.
33. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 442 (b) (1957).
34. As to a temporary job not likely, cited with approval in Pryor v. Briggs
Mfg. Co., 312 Mich. 476, 20 N.W.2d 279 (1945); Lasser v. Grunbaum Furniture
Co., 46 Wash.2d 408, 281 P.2d 832 (1955) (holding the position not important
enough to apply the Restatement's presumption.)
35. Testard v. Penn-Jersey Auto Stores, supra note 32 (holding that moving
was a sufficiently important change of position).
36. 45 F. Supp. 650 (W.D. Mo. 1942).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss4/8
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ployment to engage in the new job, valuable consideration exists" 7 Another court
has held that giving up a civil service job under which the employee had acquired
retirement rights was enough to satisfy the additional consideration requirement.38

A California court of appeals has stated 9 that for sufficient consideration there
need only be a detriment to the plaintiff, and that this requirement was met by a
termination of prior employment and a return to the employment of defendant.
Thus an oral contract, later reduced to writing, was found to be one for life employment.
In the Pennsylvania case of Lucacher v. Kerson,40 the court found plaintiff
had given sufficient consideration by terminating his past employment and moving
from New York. This made an oral contract enforceable when plaintiff was discharged without cause two days after he had begun work. 1
Through these cases and the Restatement, one may trace the development of a
definite view that where the employee has, with knowledge on the part of the employer, given up previous employment, especially employment which entitled the
employee to retirement or similar benefits, the contract is not terminable at the
will of the employer.42 Under this view the Missouri court could have held the
Morsinkhoff contract to be enforceable.
In declining enforcement of the contract, the Missouri court was following a
line of cases stating that the surrender of previous employment is not independent
consideration but merely a necessary incident to accepting new employment. The
most outstanding of these cases are Fisher v. Jackson3 and Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. v. Murray.4 ' The stronger of the two is Chesapeake, wherein

plaintiff had been told that defendant would not discuss employment while the
prospective applicant was working for another employer. The court said:
[Tihe mere giving up of a job, business, or profession by one who decided
to accept a contract for alleged life employment is but an incident neces-

37. Alabama Mills v. Smith, supra note 21.
38. Eckhart v. Plastic Flim Corp., supra note 21. See also Seymour v. Oelrichs,
156 Cal. 782, 106 Pac. 88 (1909).
39. Stone v. Burke, supra note 21. See also Millsap v. National Funding Co.,
57 Cal. App.2d 772, 135 P.2d 407 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943).
40. 158 Pa. Super. 437, 54 A.2d 245, aff'd, 355 Pa. 79, 48 A.2d 857 (1946).
41. Accord, Weber v. Perry, 201 S.C. 8, 21 S.E.2d 193 (1942).
42. The facts of the main case can easily fit within this rule. The defendant
knew that the plaintiff was working for another firm. The plaintiff told the defendant that in making the change he would be foregoing the benefit of the yearly
bonus for working the complete year (the surrender of some other benefit under
past employment).
43. 142 Conn. 734, 118 A.2d 316 (1955).
44. 198 Md. 526, 84 A.2d 870 (1951). See also Ruinello v. Murray, supra
note 21; Edwards v. Kentucky Util. Co., s-upra note 21; Lynas v. Maxwell farms,
supra note 21; Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., supra note 21; Malever v. Kay
Jewelry Co. supra note 21; Savage v. Spur Distrib. Co., supra note 21; Heideman
v. Tall's Travel Shops, 192 Wash. 513, 73 P.2d 1323 (1937).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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sary on his part to place himself in a position to accept and perform the
contract, and is not consideration for a contract of life employment.45
This is what the Missouri court held.

III. PRoMIssoRY

ESTOPPEL UNDER THE AMERICAN VIEW

There is another approach to the matter of employment contracts for an indefinite period which merits inspection. This is the use of the relatively new
doctrine of promissory estoppel. If the courts will not accept the theory that the
giving up of previous employment is sufficient to satisfy the second independent
consideration requirement, may it be argued that the facts of the case raise a
promissory estoppel in favor of plaintiff and that this may become a substitute for
consideration, or even the necessary second consideration itself?46

A. General Scope of the Doctrine
7

Williston says4 that where a promisor has made a promise which has caused
the promisee to incur substantial detriment on the faith of the promise, there are
compelling reasons for enforcing the contract if injustice cannot be avoided by
any other means, not only where the promisor intended the detriment but also
where he should reasonably have expected the detriment would be incurred.4s The
United States Supreme Court, in Dickerson v. Colgrove,49 has said that a person
will not be allowed by language or conduct to lead another person into doing
something which he would not otherwise do, and then subject such person to loss
or injury by disappointing the expectation upon which he acted. These, and similar
statements by other courts,"0 have led the American Law Institute in the Restate45. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Murray, supra note 44, at 533, 84 A.2d
at 873. The South Carolina Supreme Court, in Orsini v. Trojan Steel Corp., 219
S.C. 272, 64 S.E.2d 878 (1951), has modified this general doctrine and applied it
only in cases where the prior employment was of indefinite length.
46. The courts are in dispute over whether promissory estoppel is a kind of
consideration or whether it should be considered as a substitute for consideration.
Originally, the courts held that promissory estoppel was not sufficient consideration,
but was a substitute which could be used in certain instances in lieu thereof. Thus
promissory estoppel was given a place in the law similar to the good consideration
of blood or love and affection, which can replace sufficient consideration in certain
types of cases. Recently there has been a shift on the part of the courts and a
blurring of the distinction between sufficient consideration and the substitutes
therefor. Today several courts recognize promissory estoppel as a variety of sufficient consideration. Porter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 60 F.2d 673
(2d Cir. 1932); Miller v. Lawlor, supra note 25. For a general discussion of this
area see 47 IowA L. REv. 725 (1962).
47. 1 WILLISTON, CoNmRAcTs § 140 (3d ed. 1960).
the
48. More in point with the principal case, Professor Boyer says: 'here
promisee has made a considerable outlay or has done serious acts which, unrewvarded might jeopardize his financial or economic status, his position is one which
merits judicial intervention." Boyer, Promissary Estoppel Requirements and Limitations of Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REv.459, 479 (1950).
49. 100 U.S. 578 (1879).
50. Curtiss Candy Co. v. Silberman, 45 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1930); Volkwein
v. Volkwein, 146 Pa. Super. 265, 22 A.2d 81 (1941).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss4/8

8

1962]

Long: Long: Contracts--Promissory--Estoppel--Employment Contracts for Indefinite Duration
COMMENTS

anent of Contracts to include section 90,51 which is considered to be the basis of
-the modem doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Professor Boyer has pointed-out that courts frequently hesitate to act when
'faced with a request to enforce the entire promise because they believe that com,plete enforcement would work an injustice on the promisor, and that they there-2
fore deny any relief at all, often working an even greater hardship on the promisee,
He maintains that promissory estoppel can be used to fill the gap between a mere
promise and a completed bargain, operating rationally and logically to protect
justified reliance and to avoid patent injustice to the promisee. Boyer continues
.by suggesting that in measuring the damages granted under this doctrine, courts
53
use the well-established contracts rule of Hadley v. Baxendae.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel has become well established in several
fields of law, most notably those of charitable subscriptions, parol promises to convey land, gratuitous bailments and agencies, rent reduction cases,4 and retirement annuities. 55 The Oregon Supreme Court, in Schafer v. Fraser5 6 has said that
there is nothing peculiar about these fields which would compel the conclusion that
the doctrine of promissory estoppel is anomalous or requires narrow application and
use with restraint. Throughout these fields runs a common thread-that of justified
reliance by the plaintiff-promisee on a promise made by the defendant-promisor.
The Oregon court believed that the doctrine is one which merits general application, allowing a promise to be enforced where the plaintiff is unrecompensed for his
reliance and where the facts of the individual case bring it within the rigorous
requirements for applying the doctrine. Since Missouri has adopted the doctrine
51. The section reads: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance of a definite and substantial character on the
part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forebearance is binding
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." For cases following the Restatement, see

RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS,

CoNTRArs

§ 90, at 350

(1954 Supp.).
52. The main case seems to be a prime example of this statement.
53. 9 Ex. 341 (1854). This doctrine allows the plaintiff to recover as damages
for the breach of contract only those losses which, at the time the contract was
made, were reasonably foreseeable by the party being charged with the breach.
Another method of determining damages is suggested in 47 IowA L. REv. 725
(1962). This is the reasonable opportunity for recoupment doctrine. It is developed
from an analogy to the dealer-franchise cases, e.g., Allied Equip. Co. v. Weber
Engineered Prods., 237 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1956); Goodman v. Dicker, 83 App.
D.C. 353, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Gibbs v. Bardahl Oil Co., 331 S.W.2d
614 (Mo. 1960). Under this doctrine, the plaintiff would be allowed to recoup any
financial losses he had suffered in accepting the new employment, on the basis that
the defendant knew or should have known that the losses would occur as a result
of accepting the contract and has not allowed the contract to last a sufficient time
for the plaintiff to recoup them.
54. See Boyer, Promissory Estoppek Principle From Precedents, 50 MicH. L.
REv. 639 (1952).

55. Feinberg v. Pfeiffer, 322 S.W.2d 163 (St. L. Ct. App. 1959); West v. Hunt
Foods, Inc., 101 Cal. App.2d 597, 225 P.2d 978 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951); RESTATEMENT,

CormrAcrs § 90, illustration 2.

56. 206 Ore. 125, 290 P.2d 190 (1955).
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of promissory estoppel, 5 7 could not the Morsinkhoff case have been decided on this
basis, provided that all requirements of that doctrine were met? Certainly, it would
seem, the basic philosophy underlying an application of the doctrine in cases involving charitable subscriptions, etc., is equally present in a case involving an employment contract of indefinite duration.
B. Requirements of the Doctrine
The authorities seem to agree that there are three requirements for the application of the doctrine. 5 First, there must be a promise upon which the plaintiffpromisee relied. Second, there must be a substantial change of position on the
part of the promisee in reliance on the promise. Finally, injustice must be unavoidable except by enforcing the promise.
1. The Promise
There is some variance among the courts as to the necessary circumstances surrounding the defendant's promise. The most cogent view is expressed in the two
articles by Professor Boyer5- and by the Schafer "0 case. These authorities require
an element of foreseeability on the part of the promisor. Boyer says that the
promisor must reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance of a definite
and substantial character on the part of the promisee. The Schafer case uses the
reasonable man test, i.e.: Would a reasonable man in the position of the defendant
foresee that his promise would induce conduct on the part of the plaintiff of the
kind that actually occurred? Therefore, for the doctrine to apply, the defendant
must have some knowledge, or reasonably should realize, that his promise is going
to cause substantial reliance of a definite character on the part of the plaintiff.
How does this fit the facts of Morsinkhoff? Here defendant reasonably should
have known, and, indeed, as the evidence shows, actually did know that his offer
of employment was going to cause substantial reliance of a definite characterplaintiff's termination of former employment to accept the new employment. Therefore, all the elements are met. The defendant knew his promise was going to cause
57. Feinberg v. Pfeiffer, supra note 55. This was the first case in Missouri to recognize promissory estoppel by that name. It involved a reliance by the
plaintiff on a promise of the defendant to pay her an annuity of 200 dollars a month
for the rest of her life. The plaintiff surrendered her employment with the defendant
on the basis of this promise. This reliance was held to be sufficient detriment to
support promissory estoppel, and in this respect is analogous to the problem in the
Morsinkhoff case. Why did the court in Morsinkhoff not consider this case in
making their decision? The Feinberg case gives a good survey of the Missouri development of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and identifies Missouri's position
under Restatement section 90.
58. Schick Service, Inc. v. Jones, 173 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1949); Miller v.
Lawlor, supra note 25; Schafer v. Fraser, supra note 68; Boyer, Promissory Estoppel:
PrincipleFrom Precedents, 50 MicH. L. REv. 639 (1952); Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 459 (1950).
59. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle From Precedents,50 MIcH. L. REV.
639 (1952); Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of Doctrine,
98 U. PA. L. REv. 459 (1950).
60. Supra note 56.
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substantial reliance. He knew the exact nature of this reliance. The plaintiff did in
fact so rely. There seems to be no reason to exclude the case under this requirement.
2. Change of Position and Reliance
All the authorities are in agreement that there must be an actual and substantial change of position on the part of the plaintiff in reliance on the defendant's
promise. This reliance must be of a substantial and definite nature. Again, the main
case fits the requirements easily. No one should doubt that the giving up of a job,
where one has established seniority rights and become eligible for a bonus on completion of each year's work, is a substantial change of position on the part of the
plaintiff. The termination of any employment, where the employment is of a steady
nature, in favor of a mere promise of employment is a substantial change of posi.
tion with the economic well-being of the plaintiff definitely being affected.
The other part of this requirement is that the change be made in reliance on
the promise of the defendant. From the agreement reached in the main case, there
can be little doubt of the plaintiff's reason in quitting his present employment.
While he was unhappy with his employment, he had, at the same time, acquired
certain economic benefits under it, and was willing to give these up in order to
improve himself by accepting the defendant's offer of employment.
3. Avoiding Injustice
As a final factor, the cases impose the requirement that injustice must not be
avoidable in any other way. There must be no alternate remedy to enforcing the
contract. The Missouri court, not adopting any of the possible solutions mentioned
in this article, and finding no other remedy applicable, left the plaintiff to suffer an
injury for which there was no remedy. Here also, then, Morsinkhoff fits the requirements for promissory estoppel.
In the case of Weidman v. United Cigar Stores Co.,1 where the plaintiff was
fired soon after he had started to work, the court had this to say:
To impose on the contract a strictly legal construction of the terms
used in the hiring clause would allow the employer, for no breach whatever
on the part of the plaintiff, to deprive the latter of his employment within
the first hour after he had entered upon his duties. Any such construction
would have results which could not reasonably have been intended, and
would be in plain disregard of the meaning and spirit of the agreement 02
It is hard to believe that Morsinkhoff intended to leave his relatively secure
job63 in order to follow a will-o'-the-wisp chance that the defendant would honor
his promise of employment. Both parties must have meant this agreement to
have some definite legal effect. The court, unfortunately, appears to be applying
narrow legalistic doctrines, and thereby disregarding the intent of the parties.
61. 223 Pa. 160, 72 Atl. 377 (1909). In this case, plaintiff had sold his store
to the defendant and agreed to become the manager of the defendant's stores in
another region.

62. Id. at 163, 72 Ad. at 378.
63. He had been employed for five years.
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C. Authorities Considering the Estoppel Question
The authorities on this exact problem are few and approximately evenly split.
Mechem8 ' argues that where the employee has suffered a special detriment, such
as giving up a good job or moving his family, in consideration of permanent employment, such detriment is usually of a substantial nature and is a known and
discussed factor in the bargaining between the parties. This change of positior
should emphasize to both the employer and the court that more than a terminableemployment is expected, and that the plaintiff is contracting for something more
permanent. Thus Mechem feels that, since the change of position is made in reliance
8
on the promise of the defendant, there should be an estoppel raised against him.e
8
In Alaska Airlines v. Stephenson, the court, relying on Seymore v. Oelichs,T
felt that the relatively new growth of tenure rights and fringe benefits and their
modern importance in most jobs was sufficient to tip the scales from judicial nonenforcement of these contracts in the past to enforcement by the courts in thefuture. The court held that where the plaintiff had surrendered a job with these
tenure rights and fringe benefits in order to accept new employment, a promissory
estoppel should be raised in his favor. In a similar case, Goodman v. Dicker,"wherein the plaintiff opened a radio retailing business, hired salesmen, and incurred
the expenses of establishing the business, relying upon the promise of the defendant
to grant a franchise and deliver radios for resale, the court held that there was.
no contract on which the plaintiff could have specific performance, but that theplaintiff by way of estoppel could recover his costs of establishing the business.

Conversely, in a recent Utah case, 9 the plaintiff tried to claim under the
doctrine of estoppel that his employment contract should last from 1958 until
1966,7 in that he left his previous position, moved from Dallas, Texas, and accepted!
a lower salary and an inferior executive position. The court, in a rather obtuse
opinion, held that this would be sufficient consideration to merit the inclusion of
this provision in the original contract; but, since this was not done, it was nor
sufficient to raise an estoppel in favor of the plaintiff. Again, after speculating as;
to what the Iowa law would be on the subject, a federal court, in Bixley v. Wilson
& Co., 7 held that the giving up of farm leases in order to accept positions as;
strikebreakers with the defendant, where the defendant promised the jobs would bepermanent, but later fired plaintiffs as the result of union pressure, was insufficient

64.

MECHEM OUTLINEs AGENCY §

556 B (4th ed. 1952).

65. Ibid.

66. 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954) (oral contract for two years employment)..
67. Supra note 38.
68. Supra note 53.
69. Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559,
(1960).
70. This claim was based on his being granted stock options until this time.
71. 196 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Iowa 1961). But cf. Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co. v.
Foar, 84 F.2d 67 (7th Cir. 1936), where returning to work during a strike was held
sufficient consideration for an oral promise for permanent employment. See also,
the companion case, Albers v. Wilson & Co., 184 F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1960).
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to raise an estoppel which would satisfy the second consideration for permanent
employment 7
CONCLUSION

From these cases, it can be seen that there is a relative dearth of authority on
the precise point, and that the courts are only beginning to formulate adequate
rules. As Mechem says,7 8 the area of permanent or life employment has in the
past been one where the rules are arbitrary and unsatisfactory, often rendering
unjustified and unjust results. Part of this problem arises out of the lack of an
adequate definition of permanent employment, and the hesitancy on the part of
the courts to act, out of fear of doing injustice to the promisor, as well as a feeling of inability to measure damages. But this does not change the reality of the
fact that the plaintiff believes that he has obtained some job security and will not
be subject to dismissal without just cause. Certainly, in an age where there is a
great demand for all types of security, especially economic security, this is a reasonable belief. The courts, if they are attuned to the reality of the situation, should
not continue to turn a deaf ear to a promisee who has acted in reliance upon a
promise of employment by surrendering previous employment, and thereby allow
the promisor, knowing of this reliance, to frustrate the promisee's expectations. Certainly this is an area wherein the promisee should be able to act with the same
justified reliance as in the case of charitable subscriptions. Some of the courts have
so held, extending the doctrine of promissory estoppel to protect the promisee's
reliance. Thus the original application has been made, but only the future can tell
whether the extension will gain the acceptance that it was denied in Morsinkhoff.
JOSEPH C. LONG

72. The commentator in 47 IowA L. REv. 725 (1962) severely criticizes the
court's decision in this case, both as to the justice of the outcome and as to the
application of Iowa law. He concludes that at present the Iowa court would probably not require two considerations for this type of contract, but instead would
apply the intent of the parties test regardless of the presence or absence of the
second consideration.
73. Op. cit. supra note 64, § 552.
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